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Sex Is So Overrated: How Sexual Content
Continues to Get a Bad Rap, While Violence Is All the Rage
by Tameeka J. Bailey

I.

Introduction

A common phrase and sentiment that has been engrained in most households is that “parents
know best.” “The parent is the first and most important teacher. No one can take [their] place.”1
This idea is, more or less, universally believed by parents and rebelled against by many children,
teens and young adults. However, a more accurate representation of where parent’s knowledge
stems from would include the legal system and organizations that choose what is more easily
accessible to children, and society as a whole.2
According to the Oxford Dictionary, art is “the expression or application of human creative
skill and imagination . . . producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or
emotional power.”3 Paintings and sculptures have always been considered art over the centuries;
however, music, movies and literature have arguably surpassed these traditional forms of art, in
popularity. With the growth in popularity of these latter forms of art, the public and private
sectors have attempted to limit the exposure of art they deem to be inconsistent to family and
community values.4 “Censors now assume the guise of capitalist retailers and distributors,
special-interest groups, and less influential but still passionate religious and government
authorities.”5
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The First Amendment allows for freedom of speech with few exceptions.6 Obscenity, which
deals purely with certain forms of sexual content, is a form of speech that is not given First
Amendment protection.7 Sexual content “appealing to prurient interest,” in all art forms, can be
legally regulated.8 However, there are no laws pertaining to the policing of violence in any form
of art, which has been explicitly stated by Justice Scalia, “[a]rguing that ‘violence is not part of
the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.’”9 Given the private entities, such as
the Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA), the Record Industry Association of
America (RIAA), and the Parents’ Music Resource Center (PMRC), among others, heavily
influencing how art and entertainment is distributed to the American public, obscenity laws
should no longer exist in allowing courts to construe when artistic value is outweighed by a
community standard.
The first part of this paper addresses the history of obscenity laws, dealing with the “prurient
interest” test stated in Roth v. California. The second part demonstrates how cases have been
decided since the “prurient interest” test, which was later more clearly defined in Miller v.
California. The third section compares the imbalanced approach the United States legal system
uses when analyzing violence and sex in cases concerning controversial content. The fourth
section examines what, and how, private entities regulate and rate different forms of art in the
entertainment industry.
II.

History of U.S. Obscenity Laws
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to the Government for a redress
of grievances.10
-U.S. Constitution, 1st Amendment
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In Roth v. U.S., Justice Brennan stated in the majority opinion that “it is apparent that the
unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.”11
Although, Roth was the first case where the Supreme Court squarely dealt with the issue of
whether obscenity was protected under the right of freedom of speech, several cases in state
courts had previously deemed that obscenity was not protected.12 “As early as 1712,
Massachusetts made it criminal to publish ‘any filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel
or mock sermon’ in imitation or mimicking religious services.”13
Laws governing obscenity existed long before the United States became a nation, dating back
to Plato’s Republic.14 In 1815, the American founders’ puritan beliefs led to the first obscenity
conviction, when three Pennsylvania men were arrested for privately showing “a lewd painting,
representing a man in an obscene, impudent and indecent posture with a woman.”15 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that “[a] picture tends to excite lust, as strong as a
writing,” and since, “[t]he courts are guardians of the public morals . . . an offence may be
punishable, if in its nature and by its example, it tends to the corruption of morals.”16 The
Pennsylvania court based its decision on a 1727 London case, which convicted Edmund Curl of
publishing “an indecent book” based on the premise that “[w]hat tended to corrupt society was
held to be a breach of the peace and punishable by indictment.”17 Six years later, Massachusetts
“held John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, popularly known as Fanny Hill, to be
obscene.”18
The popular test for obscenity in American courts, prior to the current “prurient test,” derived
from an 1868 English case, Regina v. Hicklin.19 In Hicklin, the Lord Chief Justice stated that, “I
think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
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hands a publication of this sort may fall.”20 Not until 1933 did the federal courts start to break
away from Hicklin’s “corruptible minds” focus to a “reasonable person”; although, judges in
prior cases had expressed disapproval of using the test to judge obscenity in works.21 In U.S. v.
One Book Called “Ulysses”, District Judge Woolsey stated:
It is only with the normal person that the law is concerned. Such a test . . . is the
only proper test of obscenity in the case of a book like ‘Ulysses’ which is a
sincere and serious attempt to devise a new literary method for the observation
and description of mankind.22
Judge Woolsey also uses the courts definition of ‘obscene’ to go to the work “in its entirety,” as
opposed to centering on specific excerpts.23 This was later affirmed, and restated by the Second
Circuit, by Circuit Judges, Augustus N. Hand and Learned Hand.24
Not until 1957 did the ‘prurient interest” test, which is used in the United States court
system today, replace the test for judging obscenity.25 In the United States Supreme Court
case Roth v. United States, the Court consolidated a California case and a New York case,
both dealing with publication and selling of “obscene” material through the mail.26 The
California defendant was charged, and convicted, of having violated California’s obscenity
law, as enacted in that state’s penal code.27 In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan clarified
that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”28 Justice
Brennan further defined what is considered obscene by stating that “sex and obscenity are not
synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press.”29 In Footnote 20 of the opinion, the Court uses the Webster’s Dictionary definition of
‘prurient,’ and defines ‘obscene material’ as “material having a tendency to excite lustful
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thoughts.”30 The Majority, also, rejected the Hicklin standard of judging obscene material on
particular passages.31
The test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts
in those comprising a particular segment of the community . . . The test in each
case is the effect of the [works] considered as a whole, not upon any particular
class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. . . . The [works] must be
judged as a whole, in their entire context . . . . by present-day standards of the
community. [The jury] may ask [them]selves does it offend the common
conscience of the community by present-day standards.32
The dissent in Roth by Justice Douglas and Justice Black feared that a “community conscience”
standard of what is ‘obscene material’ was “too loose” and “too destructive of freedom of
expression.”33 Justice Douglas wrote, “[t]he First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute,
was designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech
against silence.”34
III.

Post “Prurient Interest” Test

Despite concerns of limiting freedom of speech, almost every state has enacted a statute in
their penal code criminalizing the publication of “obscene material.” And since the judging of
obscene material is based on a community standard of what is obscene, what is banned from one
state might be viewed and purchased freely in another, due to varying community standards.35
As stated in the concurrence in Roth:
That there is a social problem presented by obscenity is attested by the expression
of the legislatures of the forty-eight States as well as the Congress. . . . Present
laws depend largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those who
receive them. It is manifest that the same object may have a different impact,
varying according to the part of the community reached.36
Since each state has its own obscenity law, the Supreme Court must decide whether the law is
narrow enough to not infringe on the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech;
followed by whether the work is “obscene” given the evidence and the law at question.37
5

In Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, the Supreme Court found that the Ohio obscenity criminal
statute, and the guilty verdict of Jacobelli for showing the film, ‘The Lovers,’ in a movie theater
he operated, was not appropriately tailored to be valid under the First Amendment and the
“prurient interest” test.38 The Court used the test set out in Roth – “‘whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken
as a whole[,] appeals to prurient interest.’”39 ‘The Lovers,’ is about “a woman bored with her
life and marriage,” who falls in love with another man.40 The Court finds that “[t]here is one
explicit love scene in the last reel of the film, and the State’s objections are based almost entirely
upon that scene.”41 In his opinion, Justice Brennan reaffirms Roth, however, he states that the
community standard “of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national
standard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding.”42
Although, majority of the Court agreed that ‘The Lovers’ was not obscene, and Ohio
could not legally ban the movie or criminalize its exhibition, the reasoning of the judges
differed.43 Justice Black, with Justice Douglas concurring, did not believe that courts are in the
position of censoring.44 Using language from a previous case, Justice Black stated, “‘…this
Court is about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be found.’. . . the
conviction of appellant or anyone else for exhibiting a motion picture abridges freedom of the
press as safeguarded by the First Amendment, which is made obligatory on the States by the
Fourteenth.”45 Differing slightly from the other justices, Justice Stewart believed “…that under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
hard-core pornography.”46 Justice Stewart did not define what he considered to fall into that
category, but infamously wrote, “I know it when I see it . . . .”47 Justice Goldberg agreed with
Justice Brennan’s opinion, but wanted to assert that it is not appropriate to bring a criminal suit
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against a person purely exhibiting obscene material, like the Ohio courts attempted, “for by any
arguable standard the exhibitors of this motion picture may not be criminally prosecuted unless
the exaggerated character of the advertising[,] rather than the obscenity of the film[,] is to be the
constitutional criterion.”48
The dissenting justices would rather leave the difficult role of deciding what is
considered obscene to the States, upholding Ohio’s ruling as long as there is evidence permitting
so.49 Both dissenting opinions mention the increasing amount of obscenity cases brought to the
Court, with the Chief Justice acknowledging that obscenity cases “are coming to us in everincreasing numbers . . . .”50 The Chief Justice, with Justice Clark joining, endorsed following the
Roth test and its “community standard” as defined as meaning a given locality, not a “national
standard.”51 Still, he noted that the test is flawed, stating “[f]or all the sound and fury that the
Roth test has generated, it has not been unsound, and I believe that we should try to live with it –
at least until a more satisfactory definition is evolved.52 The Chief Justice goes on to state his
belief of the best way for the Court to handle obscenity cases:
I would commit the enforcement of this rule to the appropriate state and federal
courts, and I would accept their judgment made pursuant to the Roth rule, limiting
myself to a consideration only of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record
upon which such a finding of obscenity could be made. . . . [P]rotection of
society’s right to maintain its moral fiber and the effective administration of
justice require that this Court not establish itself as an ultimate censor . . . .”53
Similarly, in Justice Harlan’s dissent, the justice agreed with the Chief Justice that, “[t]he more I
see of these obscenity cases the more convinced I become that in permitting the States wide, but
not federally unrestricted, scope in this field . . . lies the best promise for achieving a sensible
accommodation between the public interest . . . and protection of genuine rights of free
expression.”54 However, Justice Harlan recommended that the States make the Roth test “one of
rationality.”55
7

There is an innate difference upon which to judge potentially obscene material that is being
exhibited to someone seeking to gain access to the work, and “a situation in which sexually
explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients who had
in no way indicated any desire to receive such materials.”56 In the facts of Miller v. California,
Miller was a man who was criminally tried under the California Penal Code for knowingly
mailing sexually explicit images to non-consenting residents, in violation of California’s criminal
obscenity statute.57 The Supreme Court acknowledges “that the States have legitimate interest in
prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of
exposure to juveniles.”58 The Court determined that it must “define the standards which must be
used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First
Amendment.”59
Justice Burger, writing the opinion of the Court, describes how the States are to identify
“obscene material” by asserting that the works in question must depict sexual conduct
“specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. . . .
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious . . . value.”60 The Court
disagrees with Justice Brennan’s use, in Jacobelli, of a “national standard,” instead, upholding
the lower courts’ instruction to trier of facts “to apply ‘contemporary community standards of the
State of California.’”61 Justice Burger clarifies that “[n]othing in the First Amendment requires
that a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable ‘national standards’ when attempting
to determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact.”62 The test that the Court
clarifies for the trier of fact contains three parts:
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(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.63
In Miller, the majority reaffirms Roth, designates how and what the States can regulate under
criminal obscenity statutes, and clarifies that the standard is a “contemporary community
standard,” as opposed to a national standard.64
It should be noted that the decision in Miller was a 5-4 decision vacating and remanding
the case to the lower courts to follow the Supreme Court’s instructions. In Jacobelli, the decision
was 5-4, as well, with the majority finding that the Ohio courts were incorrect in their findings
that the film, ‘The Lovers,’ was obscene. In Justice Douglas’ dissent in Miller, he distinguishes
his reasoning for not finding obscenity by pointing out the inconsistent opinions of the Court in
its past decisions, when faced with States’ obscenity laws and alleged “obscene material.”65 The
Justice recognizes that the decision in the current case “retreats from the earlier formulations of
the constitutional test and undertakes new definitions. . . . The difficulty is that we do not deal
with constitutional terms, since ‘obscenity’ is not mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of
Rights.”66 Given the inconsistent, and subjective, nature of what courts can consider obscene,
Justice Douglas stipulates that “[o]bscenity cases . . . have no business being in the courts. If a
constitutional amendment authorized censorship, the censor would probably be an administrative
agency. . . I do not think we, the judges, were ever given the constitutional power to make
definitions of obscenity.”67
IV.

Ratings and Regulations through Private Entities

“[E]very generation rebels. Your parents didn’t understand The Who or Jimi Hendrix; you
don’t like or understand much of your children’s music. . . Most parents believe in monitoring
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the music their children to. . . The Parental Advisory Label helps parents stay informed about
their children’s music.”68 The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) started
placing Parental Advisory Labels (PAL) on records in 1985, when two organizations, the
National Parental Association (National PTA) and Parental Music Resource Center (PMRC), put
pressure on RIAA to start labeling “music releases containing explicit lyrics, including explicit
depictions of violence and sex.”69 The RIAA is the manufacturer and/or distributor of
“approximately 85% of all legitimate recorded music produced and sold in the United States.”70
The Board of Directors has members from each major record company, and a few smaller record
companies.71 Since the PAL system was enacted, most major record companies and artists have
decided to “participate” in the system and follow the list of guidelines and requirements, which
includes, but is not limited to: clearly labeling on the cover of the product whether the sound
recording has PAL content, recommended size and color of the label, all advertisements of the
recording should “communicate the presence of PAL Content,” and all digital distributions
should also contain PAL conspicuously.72
Due to the widespread influence of the RIAA and its members, almost every album that
contains content that can be considered explicit, places the PAL logo on its cover.73 While
recording companies and the musical artists are the ones to determine whether a PAL Notice is
necessary, RIAA gives a list of content considerations when determining whether a work
contains PAL content, including “contemporary cultural morals and standards,” “context in
which material is used,” and “expectations of the artist’s audience.”74 “Though the association
does not directly represent retailers, it does “work[] closely with the National Association
Recording Merchandisers (NARM), the Digital Media Association (DiMA), the wireless
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industry, and leading technology companies . . . ,”75 which could negatively affect how an artist
distributes his music and where the music will be sold.
The PMRC, the main interest group that pressured RIAA and record companies into
enforcing PAL notices on musical works, formed in 1985.76 The group’s twenty-five members
consisted of several spouses of powerful Washington businessman and politicians, including
Tipper Gore, Susan Baker and Nancy Thurmond.77 At first, PMRC’s goal was for sexually
explicit and violent recordings to stop being played on radio and television, and to make such
forms of music be harder to gain access to.78 Tipper Gore formed the PMRC, which appeared to
be an organization aimed at censorship at its inception, after being disturbed by the lyrics of
“‘Darling Nikki,’ a very sexually explicit song,” on Prince’s ‘Purple Rain’ album, which was
purchased for her eleven year old daughter.79 After further investigation of music videos and
lyrics played on Music Television (MTV), Gore introduced the issue to others and, soon
thereafter, the United States Senate started holding hearings on the “alarming content of popular
music.”80
The influential group had a “Filthy Fifteen” list that listed “the top fifteen songs
recommended to be banned, and their presumed subject matter.”81 Of the fifteen songs listed,
nine were deemed to have censorable content due to sexual material, two songs were listed due
to violence, two songs had “drug and alcohol use,” and two songs had “occult” subject matter.82
From the subject matter of the songs listed, it seems that the members were attempting to censor
mainly sex with their promotion of upholding family values. Before the Senate hearings
concluded, the RIAA agreed to placing stickers labeling albums with parental advisory labels,
which fell short of the PMRC’s request of identifying an album’s specific content.83 Many of the
group’s demands that bordered on censorship were not enforced.84
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Since 1922, the Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) has been present in the
film industry in some form, although formerly known as Motion Picture Producers and Directors
Association of America.85 At first, the group’s members wanted “to resist mounting calls for
government censorship of American films” by creating “a system of industry-led self-censorship,
known as The Production Code or the Hays Code.”86 However, due to the change and
progression that took place in the United States throughout the decades following the society’s
formation, the MPAA decided “[a]mid our society’s expanding freedoms, the movie industry’s
restrictive regime and self-censorship could not stand,” and in 1966, the society started making
revisions “to reflect changing social mores.”87 Since 1968, the “voluntary film rating system”
has been revised to “giv[e] creative and artistic freedoms to filmmakers while fulfilling its core
purpose of informing parents about the content of films so they can determine what movies are
appropriate for their kids.”88 The MPAA’s members consist of “the six major U.S. motion
picture studios: Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Sony
Pictures Entertainment Inc.; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation; Universal City Studios
LLC; and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.”89
The MPAA, in association with the National Association of Theatre Owners, Inc. (NATO),
created the Classification and Rating Administration (CARA) as an independent division of
MPAA, whose Rating Board “issues ratings for motion pictures exhibited and distributed in the
United States.”90 CARA’s Rating Board does not “evaluate the quality or social value of motion
pictures,” but seeks to give ratings to inform parents of certain content present in films, such as
“violence, sex, drugs, language, thematic material, adult activities, etc.”91 The CARA Rating
Board includes: a Chairperson, staff members, Senior Raters, and Raters; each member “must be
a parent and may not have any other affiliation with the entertainment industry.”92 The
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Chairperson is appointed by the Chairman of the MPAA in agreement with the President of
NATO, and Senior Raters are selected by the Chairperson.93 The five motion picture ratings
consist of: G, PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17; each rating, outside of G, warrants a “rating
descriptor,” given by the Chairperson, which helps parents know the content that caused the
rating.94 The rating system is voluntary, however, a film that does not receive a rating is labeled
“Unrated,” and “the big theater chains treat unrated films like NC-17 films, since usually the
films are unrated because of graphic sexuality.”95
After each motion picture has been submitted and “viewed by designated members of the
Rating Board, including at least one Senior Rater,” the Raters discuss and determine the rating to
be assigned to the film.96 “The rating descriptor for each rated motion picture is determined by
the Chairperson of CARA or the Senior Rater, in conjunction with the Raters who viewed the
motion picture, based on the elements . . . identified in the ballots of the Raters . . . that caused
the motion picture to receive that rating.”97 The Rating Board members determine a film’s
assigned rating by “evaluat[ing] each motion picture in its entirety and consider[ing] . . . mature
themes, language, depictions of violence, nudity, sensuality, depictions of sexual activity, adult
activities (i.e. activities that adults, but not minors, may engage in legally), and drug use.” Once
the rating is assigned, CARA informs the “rating contact,” who then “advise[s] CARA whether
the producer or distributor accepts the rating and rating descriptor.”98
If the producer or distributor does not accept the rating given by the Ratings Board, they may
appeal for a final certified rating to the Classification and Rating Appeals Board, “Appeals
Board.”99 The Appeals Board is composed of several people, including: the CEO of the MPAA
and President of NATO (or his/her representatives); up to three members designated by members
of MPAA; up to three members designated by NATO; and, up to two representatives designated
13

by independent producers and distributors; along with others making up the Board.100 Each
member is appointed for a term and must attend training sessions informing them of “the
procedures and processes of the Rating Board and the Appeals Board.”101 A producer can “only
seek the next less restrictive rating on an appeal,” and “only one appeal may be taken of the
rating of each version of a motion picture and only two appeals total may be taken of the ratings
of different versions of a motion picture.”102 The appeals process is quite similar to that of the
legal system after the Appeals Board has viewed the movie, with the producer or distributor
making “a statement of the reasons for the Appeals Board to overturn the rating of the motion
picture” and the Chairperson of CARA “mak[ing] a statement of the reasons for the Appeals
Board to uphold the rating” in front of the “quorum” of nine members making up the Appeals
Board.103
Recently, attention has been drawn to the MPAA ratings and appeals process due to the
documentary motion picture, “Bully,” produced by The Weinstein Company.104 The
documentary, “which follows five kids and families who have been impacted by bullying,”
received an “R” rating from the MPAA in early 2012, for the “use of one curse word that is used
six times in the movie.”105 After appealing the initial “R” rating, “over half of the appeals board
agreed that [the movie] should be re-rated PG-13. However, the board fell one vote short of the
2/3 majority required to overturn a rating.”106 Instead of accepting the “R” rating, The Weinstein
Company chose to release the movie unrated.107 Usually, unrated films are “treated like an NC17 film, but AMC Theaters, one of the largest chains in the country, announced . . . they will
allow children under 17 to see it with a parent. They can also see it without a parent if they have
a signed permission slip.”108 After a compromise, the MPAA granted “Bully” a PG-13 rating in
response “to edit[ing] out three uses of the particular word, and the MPAA agreed to allow one
14

key scene in which one of the film’s subjects is beaten on a school bus and the word is used three
times.”109
Similar to the music and movie industries, Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB) is
a “self-regulatory body that assigns ratings for video games and apps so parents can make
informed choices.”110 The organization formed in 1994 by the Entertainment Software
Association with a mission to “empower consumers, especially parents, with guidance that
allows them to make informed decisions about the age-appropriateness and suitability of video
games and apps while holding the video game industry accountable for responsible marketing
practices.”111 And while, “[t]he rating system is voluntary, … virtually all video games that are
sold at retail in the U.S. and Canada are rated by the ESRB[,]” with “[m]any U.S. retailers . . .
hav[ing] policies to only stock or sell games that carry an ESRB rating, and console
manufacturers requir[ing] games that are published on their systems in the U.S. and Canada to be
rated by ESRB.”112 The ESRB, also, has principles and guidelines for the marketing and
advertising of video games.113 There are four rating categories that are given to video games and
placed on the front cover, ranging from appropriate for all ages to mature for persons 18 and
over.114 There are also short descriptions of the prevalent content that gave rise to the rating,
which are typically place on the back cover.115
Typically, for “packaged or boxed” video games, the publisher provides a filled out “Long
Form” questionnaire, along with a DVD that “captures all pertinent content . . . along with the
most extreme instances of content,” to the ESRB raters to “evaluate the content of each game in
advance of its public release.”116 For games that are delivered via download or solely online, the
publisher is required to fill out a “Short Form” with multiple choice questions, but foregoes
providing a DVD, which is then “assigned ratings via an automated online process.”117 The
15

ESRB raters give final ratings based on these processes, and wait to “play-test” the actual game
until shortly after being publicly released, “to verify that the content disclosure provided to
ESRB was accurate and complete.”118 While, “the identities of ESRB raters are kept
confidential . . . they are not permitted to have any ties to or connections with any individuals or
entities in the video game industry,” and must be “adults who typically have experience with
children, whether through prior work experience, education or as parents or caregivers.”119 The
raters base their rating assignments on “criteria such as violence, language, sexuality, gambling,
and alcohol, tobacco and drug reference or use; and . . . relative frequency of extreme
content.”120 And due “the interactive nature of video games the ESRB rating system also takes
into account certain unique elements, such as the viewer’s perspective, reward system and the
degree of player control.”121
Separate from larger organizations having direct ties to politicians and the entertainment
industry, smaller corporate entities have attempted to suppress certain forms of entertainment, as
well. In 2012, the e-commerce company, Paypal, a successful and common method of payment
on online selling forums such as eBay, decided to stop allowing merchants to use their services
to sell books that fall under the genre of “erotica.”122 The corporation gave an “ultimatum” to
several online bookstores to remove all content containing “bestiality, rape, and incest,” as well
as, BDSM (bondage & discipline/domination & submission/sadism & masochism), “or face
deactivation of their PayPal account[s].”123 Since a media backlash on Paypal, the corporation
has receded from banning “entire classes of books,” and focusing on individual books that go
against their corporate policy.124
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V.

Violence Versus Sexual Content

Whereas sexual content has continuously found itself being regulated by the legislature and
judged in the court system, with certain categories being deemed unfit for society, violence has
always been an inappropriate subject for judges to consider limiting protection to under the First
Amendment. When cases concerning violence in media are brought to the judicial system,
courts persistently assert that violent content is protected by freedom of speech. This has led to
the arbitrary reality that sexually-themed entertainment is subject to being more harshly analyzed
by judges and juries and outside organizations, while violence in entertainment is capable of
reaching the masses with little, to no, interference by judicial or legislative bodies.
In Pahler v. Slayer, the California Supreme Court, while noting that the heavy metal band,
Slayer’s, lyrics “are profane and glorify grisly violence against women,” could not correlate the
selling of Slayer’s album to be “harmful to children” under the California Penal Code section
313.1.125 In Pahler, the plaintiffs filed suit against the band following the sentencing of three
teenage boys who kidnapped, tortured, raped and eventually killed the plaintiff’s young
daughter.126 Defendant’s lyrics were argued to have influenced the crime; however, Slayer’s
content could not fall under the California obscenity law.127 The California statute criminalized
“‘knowingly sell[ing], rent[ing], distribut[ing], send[ing], caus[ing] to be sent, exhibit[ing], or
offer[ing] to distribute or exhibit by any means . . . any harmful matter to the minor.’”128
However, the “harmful matter” in the statute was defined in a subsection, using the three
elements for judging obscenity as pronounced in Miller v. California.129 The Court explained
that “[t]he statute limits its application to material that describes sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way. It does not make unlawful the distribution of media which offensively describes
death, violence, or brutality.”130
17

The court further explained why Slayer’s lyrics were not capable of being analyzed by the
California law as defined by the state’s penal code by assessing that “[t]he dominant theme of
Slayer lyrics is not sex. It is death, violence, brutality, and sociopathic behavior. References to
sexual conduct appear infrequently.”131 When analyzing one of the band’s more disturbing
songs, “Sex. Murder. Art,” the court describes the song’s lyrics as “refer[ing] to the speaker's
“sexual fascination” and the act of ‘raping again and again.’ But the focus of the composition is
not sexual conduct; rather, it is violence and the pleasure derived by the performer in repeatedly
whipping, beating, and raping a woman.”132 Staying within the parameters of what obscenity
laws can regulate, the court determines that “the lyrics are offensive and abhorrent because of the
callous violence described, not because of their sexual content.”133 The California court ended
its analysis of Slayer’s material by stating that, “Slayer recordings do not appeal to a morbid
interest in sex and do not, taken as a whole, depict or describe sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way. The violent content of Slayer materials does not subject them to regulation under
Penal Code section 313.1.”134
In McCollum v. CBS, the California Court of Appeals dealt with the parents of a suicide
victim who blamed Ozzy Osbourne’s lyrics and message in the death of their son.135 And while
the plaintiffs brought suit under the “incitement to imminent action” exception of the First
Amendment, the analysis of the California appeals court when judging Osbourne’s music is
broad enough to cover all areas of speech in entertainment.136 The Court defended Osbourne’s
lyrics by asserting that “the First Amendment is an absolute bar to plaintiffs’ claims.”137 The
court’s opinion identified that “musical lyrics and poetry cannot be . . . read literally on their
face, nor judged by a standard of prose oratory. . . . To do so would indulge a fiction which
neither common sense nor the First Amendment will permit.”138 In concluding the court’s
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reasoning of why Osbourne’s music is constitutionally protected and, therefore, not liable for
criminal or civil damages, the court further expressed its belief that “[t]he deterrent effect of
subjecting the music and recording industry to such liability because of their programming
choices would lead to a self-censorship which would dampen the vigor and limit the variety of
artistic expression.”139
In a more recent decision in accord with the tradition of protecting expression that is not
associated with sexual content, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute that
attempted to regulate the content of “‘violent video games’ to minors.”140 In Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA), a large
corporation in the video game industry, “filed a preenforcement challenge to a California law
that restricts the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.”141 The statute mirrored the test
for obscenity as spelled out in Miller and adopted by California, replacing “prurient interest”
with “a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” and listing a “range of options” considered to be
violent.142 Coinciding with previous Supreme Court holdings concerning the expansion of
unprotected speech, Justice Scalia states that “California has tried to make violent-speech
regulation look like obscenity regulation . . . That does not suffice. Our cases have been clear
that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds
shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct.”143
In the dicta of the opinion, the Court expounds on why the California statute cannot be
upheld under the same theory or analysis of state-enacted obscenity laws, nor using similar
reasoning for not protecting sexual content.144 The Court relies heavily on the established
institution of permitting depictions of violence to be widely accessible, if not glorified, in the
United States.145 Justice Scalia explains that “California’s argument would fare better if there
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were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to
depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read – or read
to them when they are younger – contain no shortage of gore.”146 Advancing his argument,
Justice Scalia lists popular stories read to children and books assigned in school curricula that
depict violence, and a short overview of the resistance to violent material in entertainment over
the decades, as new media has been developed and popularized.147 The Justice explains that
California cannot enact a law “impos[ing] a restriction on the content of protected speech . . .
unless [the State] can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny,” which the State failed by not
“show[ing] a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors.”148 The Court
acknowledges that strict scrutiny “is a demanding standard. ‘It is rare that a regulation restricting
speech because of its content will ever be permissible.’”149
In the concurrence to Brown, with the Chief Justice joining, Justice Alito concurs with the
judgment but disagrees “with the approach taken in the Court’s opinion,” expressing his belief
that the “Court should proceed with caution.”150 Justice Alito agrees with the Court’s outcome
based solely on the reasoning that “the California law does not define ‘violent video games’ with
the ‘narrow specificity’ that the Constitution demands.”151 He recognizes that, “[f]or better or
worse, our society has long regarded many depictions of killing and maiming as suitable features
of popular entertainment,” and due to the lack of history of regulation of violent material in
regards to any age group, the California legislature failed to clearly define the terms and
standards referenced in the law.152 Although, Justice Alito recognizes that the California law
was not sufficiently narrow enough to adhere to the protection afforded by the First Amendment,
he articulates his concern with the reality that stems from the Court’s reasoning in the opinion,
which is that “[a]s a result of today’s decision, a State may prohibit the sale to minors of what
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Ginsberg described as ‘girlie magazines,’ but a State must surmount a formidable (and perhaps
insurmountable) obstacle if it wishes to prevent children from purchasing the most violent and
depraved video games imaginable.”153
The New York criminal law that the California legislature attempted to model its state law
regulating “‘violent video games’ to minors” on, was upheld as constitutional “on its face” in
1968 in the case, Ginsberg v. State of N.Y..154 In Ginsberg, the appellant was a store owner in
Bellmore, Long Island, who sold “girlie” magazines to a 16 year-old boy on two different
occasions.155 He was criminally charged for violating the “New York criminal obscenity statute
which prohibits the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene.”156
Although, the Supreme Court recognizes that the “girlie” magazines in question were not
considered obscene for adults, as stated in a prior case, the Court asserts that States have the
power to regulate sexual material on a different scope when concerning minors.157 Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan states that there are at least two reasons that States are justified in
regulating “the availability of sex material to minors under 17”: providing “support of laws” to
parents and others involved in rearing children, and there being an interest to the State “‘to
protect the welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded from abuses’ which might
prevent their ‘growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.’”158
Unlike the California statute regulating violent content in entertainment to minors, the New
York law stemmed from a long-established foundation of regulating sexual material through
obscenity laws. While, the appellant argued that there is no proof “that obscenity is or is not ‘a
basic factor in impairing the ethical and moral development of youth and a clear and present
danger to the people of the state,’ the Court emphasizes that, “‘while these studies all agree that a
causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been
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disproved either.’ We do not demand of legislatures ‘scientifically certain criteria of
legislation.’”159 This is the opposite of the outcome stated in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n, where the Court required the State of California to show a causal link between the stateenacted law and the purpose.160 Another factor that differentiates Ginsberg from Brown, is that
the Court found that the language and terms used in the New York statute in question in
Ginsberg, were clearly defined in the New York Penal Code and through the established
standards of judging sexual material through obscenity laws.161
Unlike the aforementioned cases in this section, Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro dealt
precisely with the array of content that can be judged through obscenity laws. In a case that has
since been infamously overturned, the sexually explicit lyrics of the Florida rap trio, 2 Live
Crew, were on trial in Skyywalker Records, Inc..162 2 Live Crew filed suit against the defendant,
the sheriff of Broward County, Florida, seeking to stop the sheriff’s ban of the group’s album,
“As Nasty As They Wanna Be,” from being sold at local record stores.163 A Broward County
Circuit Court judge had previously “explicitly found probable cause to believe [the] recording
was obscene under section 847.011 of the Florida Statutes and under applicable case law,” and
allowed the Sheriff’s office to distribute a copy of the order banning the album throughout the
county.164 While the court clarifies that each state is capable of creating its own high or low
standards of obscenity, it interprets the Florida legislature as having “intended to regulate
obscenity to the maximum extent allowed by the Constitution of the United States.”165 District
Judge Gonzalez, sitting without a jury, agreed that “As Nasty As They Wanna Be,” violated the
heightened Florida statute against obscenity and “normal, community standards,” stating that
“‘Nasty’ appeals to the prurient interest for several reasons. First, its lyrics and the titles of its
songs are replete with references to female and male genitalia . . . masturbation, cunnilingus,
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sexual intercourse, and the sounds of moaning.”166 The Court further observed that “music of
the ‘rap’ genre focuses upon verbal messages accentuated by a strong beat. . . . The evident goal
of this particular recording is to reproduce the sexual act through musical lyrics. It is an appeal
directed to ‘dirty’ thoughts and the loins, not to the intellect and the mind.”167
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s ban of “As Nasty As They Want to Be” in
Broward County, FL, and the lower court’s finding of a violation under Florida’s obscenity law,
because “[a] work cannot be held obscene unless each element of the Miller test has been met.
We reject the argument that simply by listening to this musical work, the judge could determine
that it had no serious artistic value.”168 After the initial banning of the album in Broward
County, 2 Live Crew was arrested and criminally tried for a concert performance within the
district.169 As opposed to the district court trial, where Judge Gonzalez made the obscenity
determination without a jury, the jury selection of the criminal trial favored the rap group, and 2
Live Crew were found not guilty applying the “contemporary community standards” of Florida
residents.170 Bruce Rogow, the well-respected entertainment attorney for Luke Skyywalker of
the 2 Live Crew, was quoted after the obscenity trial victory exclaiming,
Censorship cannot survive the human desire to know and to judge things for
one’s self. No law, judge or jury will ever eradicate that irrepressible instinct.
We could have a thousand obscenity trials, but words and thoughts about sex will
never be limited to a missionary view. Prurient interest, openly offensive
descriptions of sexual conduct and serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific
value should be discussed some place – any place – rather than the courts.171
Following 2 Live Crew’s highly-publicized trials throughout the court system, standing
up against obscenity laws and defending artist’s freedom of speech, the group became
more popular in the media, to musical peers and the American audience.172
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VI.

Conclusion

Obscenity laws, and the reasoning behind why the courts have deemed certain sexual conduct
and content to be analyzed using “prurient interest” standard, rely on a history of society not
wanting material of a sexual nature to be easily accessible to children and adults, alike. “Sex has
been called ‘a great and mysterious motive force in human life.’ Because of its power, both
federal and state governments have chosen to regulate its abuse. For example, states have
banned prostitution, incest, rape, and other sexually related material.”173 The problem with this
reasoning is that most violence goes against all social interest. Given the current U.S. social
climate, children and many adults appear to not only be susceptible to violence, whether that
violence comes through words, imagery or simulation in video games, but violence is becoming
more pronounced in everyday life. The fact that almost all violent acts are criminalized through
state statutes shows that violence goes against community standards. On the other hand, most
consensual sex acts, even those considered outside the norm, are not state regulated. This gives
less foundation to a state’s interest in regulating an artistic expression based on its sexual nature.
Whether in regards to clothing, dancing, rock and roll, rap/hip-hop, art, movies, or video
games, there is perpetually going to be a previous generation that tries to lessen the value of an
emerging art form they do not understand.174 It is counterintuitive to continue to have judges
and/or juries determine what has “serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific value.” For
instance, the novel “Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” by John Cleland, held to be obscene in
Massachusetts in 1821, was later found to have a “modicum of merit” in 1966 by the Supreme
Court.175 Obscenity laws, which seek to criminalize ‘obscene material,’ requires a “community
standard”; a standard which is ever-changing.
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Outside of the court rooms, sexual content continues to be regulated in different forums, by
different agencies, using a lower threshold of offense than violence. The MPAA, RIAA, ESRB
and others should qualm any fears that without obscenity laws, sexual content might flow
rampantly throughout entertainment and the arts. These organizations also seem to favor
violence to sexually-themed material, as well, with most of their respective websites expressing
their purpose and intent to continue to “respect the core American value of freedom of
expression,” while “help[ing] parents determine what is and is not appropriate for their
children.”176 This balancing act, which U.S. history and obscenity laws have shown, gives more
discretion to violence than sex in entertainment.
Obscenity laws have a subjective element that questions the “value” of a work. Courts
should not be the reigning assessor of the worth of an individual’s expression of his, or her,
ideas. In the 1933 case, U.S. v. One Book Called “Ulysses”, District Judge Woolsey stated, in
regards to James Joyce’s novel:
If one does not wish to associate with such folk as Joyce describes, that is one's
own choice. In order to avoid indirect contact with them one may not wish to read
‘Ulysses’; that is quite understandable. But when such a great artist in words, as
Joyce undoubtedly is, seeks to draw a true picture of the lower middle class in a
European city, ought it to be impossible for the American public legally to see
that picture?177
These same concerns were shown in case against the rap trio, 2 Live Crew with the album, “As
Nasty As They Wanna Be.” 2 Live Crew were expressing themselves in a form of music that
was not well-regarded at the time and describing an urban lifestyle that some did not feel
comfortable with acknowledging. This does not give their expression any less right to be
protected under the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.
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I agree with Justice Douglas’ dissent in Miller, that there needs to be a well-defined
definition of “obscenity” to allow the courts to follow guidelines and not their “own
predilections.”178 Since this unlikely to occur, courts should only look into the potential
obscenity of a work when an artist’s First Amendment right is being trampled, not when a form
of art is being presented to a court by a state or individual’s war on material they find offensive.
In regard to multiple books that were brought into the court under the Pennsylvania obscenity
statute in Commonwealth v. Gordon, Judge Curtis Bok remarked:
It will be asked whether one would care to have one's young daughter read these
books. I suppose that by the time she is old enough to wish to read them she will
have learned the biologic facts of life and the words that go with them. There is
something seriously wrong at home if those facts have not been met and faced and
sorted by then; it is not children so much as parents that should receive our
concern about this. I should prefer that my own three daughters meet the facts of
life and the literature of the world in my library than behind a neighbor's barn, for
I can face the adversary there directly. If the young ladies are appalled by what
they read, they can close the book at the bottom of page one; if they read further
they will learn what is in the world and in its people, and no parents who have
been discerning with their children need fear the outcome. Nor can they hold it
back, for life is a series of little battles and minor issues, and the burden of choice
is on us all, every day, young and old. Our daughters must live in the world and
decide what sort of women they are to be, and we should be willing to prefer their
deliberate and informed choice of decency rather than an innocence that continues
to spring from ignorance. If that choice be made in the open sunlight, it is more
apt than when made in shadow to fall on the side of honorable behavior.179
When balancing the state interest in “obscene material,” being bought and sold by consenting
persons, against the promotion of freedom of expression and the advancement of the arts, it is
rare that the scale is in favor of suppressing creativity.
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